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FRENCH REFORMS IN DOMESTIC LAW
Through a series of recent acts the French have changed their
traditional Civil Code provisions to reflect recognition of equal rights
and responsibilities for women.' These changes, dealing primarily
with authority within the family and the power of the spouses to
manage their property, are of special interest in Louisiana since many
represent alterations of Civil Code articles parallel to our own and
illustrate an alternative found compatible with a similar civilian tra-
dition.
Family Residence
In 1970 the French National Assembly rejected a paternalistic
tradition of family authority and substituted a system more respon-
sive to the evolving demand for equality between the spouses.2 Under
the 1804 French Code the wife was obligated to live with her husband
wherever he chose to reside, but the husband's reciprocal obligation
to receive her was not added until 1938.1 The 1970 law states that the
spouses are mutually obliged to a common life and that the residence
of the family should be at the place chosen by their common accord.
However, it further provides that the husband's decision will prevail
in case of disagreement,4 thereby making the impact of the new provi-
sion somewhat illusory.
Nevertheless, the new law may have reduced the husband's con-
trol by increasing the number of situations in which the wife can
obtain legal authorization to establish a separate residence. Pre-
viously, the wife was required to prove that the husband's choice of
residence presented physical or moral dangers to the family; under
the new law she need only show grave inconveniences caused by her
1. Law of 18 Feb. 1938 removing legal incapacities of married women; Law of 22
Sept. 1942 decreasing the wife's incapacities and establishing the regime of biens
reserves; Law of 13 July 1965 changing the legal matrimonial regime from community
of acquets and movables to community reduced to acquets and restructuring rights and
obligations of spouses concerning management of marital expenses; Law of 4 June 1970
giving parents more equal responsibility in care and education of children.
2. See Law no. 70-459 of 4 June 1970.
3. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 214 (as amended in 1938, prior to revision in 1970)
(resulting in a rule very similar to that of LA. CIv. CODE art. 120); 1 WEILL, DRorr CivIL
n * 314 (3 me ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as WEILL].
4. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 215.
5. The effectiveness of this provision is severely questioned by several commenta-
tors, noting that the domicile of a wife with an authorized separate residence remains
that of her husband, according to FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 108. R. LEGEAIS, L'AUTORIT9
PARENTALE (ETUDE DE LA LOI NO. 70-459 Du 4 JUIN 1970 ET DES TEXTES QUE L'ONT
COMPLETI E) 36 [hereinafter cited as LEGEAIS].
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husband's decision.' The authorization of the wife's separate resi-
dence is comparable to a legal separation in that it suspends the
obligation of the communal life and converts the obligation of support
and assistance to one of a solely financial nature, which may be
enforced like any other alimony obligation.7 However, unlike a legal
separation, the authorization does not change the wife's domicile
from that of her husband.'
Exercise of Parental Authority
Perhaps the most interesting change effected by the new law is
its modification of the authority exercised by parents over their chil-
dren.' Prior to 1970 this authority, termed "paternal power,"' 0 be-
longed to both parents during the marriage but was exercised by the
father in his role as head of the family." Consequently, the mother
was required to seek the father's permission for all acts concerning
the child, including everyday functions considered usual acts of par-
enthood. 2 The 1970 law removes the husband as head of the house-
hold and creates a new system of "parental authority," placing the
parents in more equal positions of authority over their children. It
requires that the parents exercise this authority concurrently 3 and
recognizes that although parents should be encouraged to act to-
gether, each should be authorized to act separately in performing
6. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 215.
7. WEILL n * 322, 323. For the law concerning procedure for enforcing alimony
obligations, see Law no. 73-5 of 2 Jan. 1973, which is located following C. Civ. art. 211
(71 re ed. Petis Codes Dalloz 1973-74).
8. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 108; LEGEAIS 36.
9. The Law of 4 June 1970 made extensive changes in the entire area of authority
over minors, dealing with powers and responsibilities comprising parental authority,
its devolution in case of termination of the marriage or malfeasance by the parents,
measures for educative assistance when the health or security of the child is endan-
gered, possibilities of delegating or being deprived of parental authority and applica-
tion of the law in various specific cases. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 213, 215, 371-87, 389,
1384; FRENCH CODE DE LA FAMILLE ET DE L'AIDE SOCIALE arts. 46, 49, 50, 64 which is
located following C. Civ. art. 487 (71 re ed. Petis Codes Dalloz 1973-74); Law no. 70-
459 of 4 June 1970 arts. 6-18 which is located following C. Civ. art. 387.
10. Although the French term "puissance paternelle," translated "paternal
power" is similar to the term "paternal authority" used in the Louisiana Civil Code,
Louisiana jurisprudence has interpreted the latter term as synonymous with parental
authority, and as exercised simultaneously by both parents during their marriage, but
subject to paternal preeminence in case of difference. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 216.
11. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 213 (as it appeared prior to 1970).
12. Colombet, Commentaire de la loi du 4 juin 1970 sur l'autorit6 parentale,
[1971] D. Chron. [hereinafter cited as Colombet].
13. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 372.
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ordinary parental functions when their mutual action is impossible
or impractical.'4
This authorization derives from a presumption in favor of third
persons in good faith that a parent acts with the consent of the other
when performing any ordinary act of parental authority concerning
the person of the child.' 5 This presumption, coupled with the power
of each spouse to bind the community for ordinary expenses concern-
ing the children," provides practical guarantees to third persons nec-
essary to effectuate the law's initial grant of equal authority to the
parents. Though the phrase, "an ordinary act of parental author-
ity,""7 is somewhat vague and will require judicial interpretation to
determine its exact scope,'" many acts previously requiring written
permission of the father, such as passport application, registration in
a school or recreational camp and authorization for minor surgical
operations, can now be performed by either parent." The negative
implication of the presumption is that extraordinary acts of parental
authority must be performed by the parents jointly and that acts
concerning the patrimony of the child can be performed only by the
parent having legal administration of the child's estate, a right
usually exercised by the father. Furthermore, the presumption of
accord can be dispelled by any indication of the other parent's oppo-
sition, though the opposing parent bears the burden of proving that
a third party involved knew of his opposition."0
Another important feature of the new law is the procedure de-
vised to resolve disagreements between the parents as to the proper
exercise of their authority. In such situations the parents are bound
to follow whatever practices they have followed previously;' when
they cannot agree on the existence or applicability of a prior practice,
14. LEGEAIS 35. This observation is based on an interpretation of FRENCH CIV. CODE
arts. 372 and 372.2. The latter article establishes a presumption in favor of third
persons in good faith that a parent performing any ordinary act of parental authority
concerning the person of the child has the consent of the other parent. See also text at
notes 15-20 infra.
15. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 372.2.
16. Id. art. 220.
17. Id. art. 372.2 (trans. supplied).
18. Commentators point out that French legislation is traditionally drafted in
broad language to allow more practical application by the courts. LEGEAIS 86.
19. WEILL n 0 730; Colombet 13.
20. Id.
21. Professor Cornu has compared this system of resolving differences by reliance
on prior practices to the principle in property law which favors the right of the posses-
sor and forces the challenger of his possession to bear the burden of explaining his
disruption of the status quo. LEGEAiS 82-83.
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either may seek a decision from a special judge of tutorships.12 The
judge must consider any application made to him, but like the
spouses, he is bound by any prior practice that he finds to have
existed,"3 unless he determines that it is contrary to the interest of the
family or the child involved. 4 Furthermore, the parent bringing the
action has the burden of proving, as a prerequisite to the judge's
intervention, that no prior practice has ever been established or that
the practice is harmful or inapplicable to the situation in question. 5
This procedure reduces judicial interference in family matters, en-
courages accord between parents who prefer to follow a previously
acceptable practice rather than display their family disagreements
before a judge and provides a rule to follow pending judicial deci-
sion."
The 1970 law also establishes mutual responsibility for a child's
tortious conduct. In contrast to the prior law, which like its Louisiana
equivalent," provided that the father was solely responsible for the
torts of his minor child living at home," the revised French article
holds the parents solidarily liable as long as both have custody over
the child." The practical result of this modification is that the
mother's separate property becomes obligated for payment of any
damages caused by the child, in addition to community assets and
the father's separate property.
Despite the great strides made by the 1970 law toward equaliza-
tion of the spouses' roles regarding their children, the legal adminis-
tration of the children's estates remains under the control of the
22. The juge des tutelles, a magistrate of the lowest local civil court (tribunal
d'instance), has general power of surveillance over the legal administrations and tutor-
ships in his district. The institution was established in Law no. 64-1230 of 14 Dec. 1964.
WEILL n * 774.
23. The judge must also take into consideration any previous agreements made
between the spouses, including those in the marriage contract, unless one of the
spouses can justify the revocation of his consent. Written proof of the agreement is not
required. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 376.1; LEGEAIS 79.
24. LEGEAIs 81; WEILL n 0 731.
25. LEGEAIS 83.
26. Id. at 80.
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2318.
28. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1384 (4th unnumbered paragraph, as it appeared prior
to 1970).
29. Id., as amended by Law of 4 June 1970. The right of custody is considered in
French law as an aspect of parental authority; therefore, in the ordinary family situa-
tion, both parents exercise it together. However, in cases of legal separation, establish-
ment of a separate residence for the wife, divorce, or death of one of the spouses, the
right of custody can be isolated from other aspects of parenthood (i.e., administration
of the child's estate) and exercised by one of the parents alone or a third person. WEILL
n 0 711-13.
19741
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
father during the marriage,'" though concurrence of the mother is
required for all acts of alienation.3' The National Assembly recog-
nized the inequality of the parents in this area during debates on the
1970 law, yet left the administration with the father to avoid the
complexity of dual management of property when dealing with third
persons .3
Organization of Family Finances
Elements of the New Regime
As in Louisiana, French law traditionally has viewed the ar-
rangement of family finances as a matter of contract to be agreed
upon by the spouses before marriage and has provided a legal matri-
monial regime which spouses are presumed to adopt if they make no
contrary agreement.33 The French Civil Code of 1804 established the
legal matrimonial regime of the "community of acquets and mova-
bles" which was completely under the control and management of the
husband. It was composed of all movable property owned by either
spouse whether acquired before or during marriage, all property ac-
quired by either spouse during marriage other than by succession or
donation and all fruits or profits derived from the separate property
of each spouse. The husband as head of the community administered
the wife's separate property as usufructuary. 4 In 1907 the wife was
given complete control over all gains and salaries acquired in her
exercise of a separate profession, as well as all property acquired with
these gains and salaries. Termed the wife's biens reserves (reserved
property), this property was technically part of the community and
was treated as such upon dissolution of the marriage." A second
change in 1942 gave the wife the right to bind the community for
30. See Law no. 64-1230 of 14 Dec. 1964, which completely reorganized the admin-
istration of the child's patrimony and the establishment of tutorships.
31. FRENCH CiV. CODE art. 383; WEILL n 0 773. If the mother refuses to consent to
some act requiring her concurrence, the father may appeal to the judge of tutorships
for a ruling dispensing with the necessity of her consent. Id. at 774.
32. WEILL n * 773. The Assembly further determined that the mother could prob-
ably find sufficient financial support for any acts of parental authority in her ability
to bind the community for such acts under the 1965 revision of FRENCH CiV. CODE art.
220, giving both spouses the right to contract alone for ordinary expenses of the house-
hold and the children. LEGEAIS 86.
33. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1387; 4 MAZEAUD, LEqONS DE DROIT CIVIL n' 32-39
[hereinafter cited as MAZEAUD]; Weill n 324. See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 2325.
34. MAZEAUD n* 91, 130, 319.
35. Law of 13 July 1907; MAZEAUD n' 25.
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ordinary household expenses by establishing her as the husband's
legal representative in such transactions."
In 1965 the French National Assembly completely revised the
nature of the legal regime, as well as the basic requirements for all
regimes. 7 In lieu of the prior community of acquets and movables,
the new law substituted a community of acquets alone as the legal
matrimonial regime. The community was still administered by the
husband, but the definition of acquets was significantly restricted by
allowing each spouse to retain control of his gains and salaries after
discharging the expenses of the marriage.3" This provision seems to
have made no practical change in the powers of the spouses because
the new law specifically continued the regime of biens reserves which
guaranteed the wife's power to administer not only her gains and
salaries but also property acquired with her gains and salaries from
a separate profession.
The new law also provides a presumption in favor of third per-
sons in good faith dealing with an individual spouse that each has the
power to contract concerning movables in his possession, except those
related to the family lodging or which by their nature relate to the
other spouse. 0 This presumption may be of more practical import-
ance than the grant of individual control, since prior to 1965 creditors
were often reluctant to deal with any married woman without her
husband's authority, regardless of her powers under the regime of
biens reserves.11
In further modifying the definition of acquets, the new legal re-
36. Law of 22 Sept. 1942; MAZEAUD n ° 25. This law merely confirmed the jurispru-
dential rule that accorded the wife a tacit mandate from her husband to perform the
ordinary acts of household management. Both the jurisprudence and the 1942 law
allowed the husband to revoke this mandate, but such revocation was valid only if the
third person involved had personal knowledge of it.
37. Law no. 65-570 of 13 July 1965. An initial attempt at revision of the matri-
monial regime laws was made in 1959, but when the two houses of the National
Assembly failed to reach an agreement, the project was withdrawn. MAZEAUD n ° 93.
38. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 224 as amended by Law no. 65-570 of 13 July 1965.
Though the commentaries are split as to the effect of this provision, the jurisprudence
tends to classify gains and salaries as part of the community to be divided between
the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage, even though they remain under the
complete control of the respective spouses during the marriage. Epoux Digneaux,
D.1970.434 (Trib. de gr. inst. Bordeaux, 17 June 1969 and note by Morin), [1970]
J.C.P. II. 16561 (and note by Courturier), Gaz. Pal. 1969.2.183 (and note by Baranger);
(Cour d'appel de Bordeaux, Ire Ch., 5 Jan. 1971) D.1971.155 (and note by Morin),
[1971] J.C.P. II. 16721 (and note by Patarin).
39. FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 224, 1401, 1425; MAZEAUD ni 0 25, 129.
40. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 222; MAZEAUD n * 25-3 his.
41. MAZEAUD n o 25.
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gime excludes from the community the fruits and profits realized
from the spouses' separate property, though any goods purchased
with such fruits or profits belong to the community. However, unlike
the modification allowing each spouse control of his gains and sala-
ries, this provision is not mandatory and can be altered by the mar-
riage contract.42
In spite of the extensive reduction of the community by the 1965
law, it retains much of its original importance in practice because of
the continued strength of the presumption that any property belong-
ing to the spouses is community unless proved to be separate.,, This
presumption can be defeated only. if a spouse fastidiously maintains
the distinct nature of his separate property and preserves proof of its
origin. Although this presumption supposedly operates against third
persons who must assume that property held by a spouse is com-
munity unless proof of its separate nature is presented, such applica-
tion seems likely to be seriously undercut by the more recently estab-
lished presumption relative to third persons that a spouse has the
power to transact with any movables in his possession."
Expenses of the Marriage
Because the spouses' gains, salaries and revenues from separate
property, certainly the greatest part of the family income in most
cases, no longer fall immediately into the community, the expenses
of the marriage must be met by some other plan. Though the spouses
are free to choose their own method for meeting these expenses, the
new law provides that where no contrary agreement is made, the
,spouses should each contribute according to their respective abilities
and that all their property is liable to this obligation. 5 In most cases
the percentage to be contributed by each spouse is not a problem
since family expenses are usually as great as the entire incomes of the
spouses. However, when spouses' resources exceed family expenses
and they cannot agree on the amount to be contributed by each,
42. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 1401, 1403. Though still uncertain in all of its specific
applications, the rule is thought to be that whereas gains and salaries are treated as
separate property and revenues from separate property are in fact separate, any goods
acquired with such gains, salaries or revenues become community property, as long as
the acquired goods are of a different nature than the original gains, salaries or revenues.
For example, interest from a savings account composed of gains, salaries or revenues,
or savings bonds purchased with such gains, would remain separate property. MAZEAUD
n 
° 130, 131, 132-2.
43. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1402.
44. MAZEAUD n ° 122.
45. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 214.
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appeal may be made to a judge to determine their respective abilities
to contribute." Responsibility for family expenses is charged to the
husband as primary obligor, 7 and he may satisfy these expenses ei-
ther from the community or from his own resources, or he may de-
mand contribution from his wife when she has property or resources
at her disposal. The wife may satisfy her portion of the expenses
directly from the resources under her administration, or she may pay
her contribution to her husband for his administration. If she has no
resources of her own, she cannot be forced to seek employment and
may choose to satisfy her obligation of contribution by her work in
the home or her participation in the profession of her husband." The
new law also establishes a procedure for forcing a spouse to contribute
his share toward family expenses:" in addition to providing possible
grounds for divorce or legal separation if considered a grave injury,"
a spouse's failure to meet the obligation of contribution may subject
him to garnishment of wages or criminal charges of abandonment of
family."
Mandates
To facilitate the management of family finances, French law has
developed a system of representation by which one spouse can, in
certain circumstances, exercise the powers of the other.52 The 1965
law continued this system by allowing either spouse to give a man-
date to the other to represent him in the exercise of any powers
attributed to him in the matrimonial regime. Such a mandate can be
either general or specific and seems to involve the same obligations
46. MAZEAUDn ° 27.
47. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 214.
48. Id.; WEILL n 327.
49. The need for such provision arises most often in cases of abandonment by one
of the spouses.
50. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 232; WEILL n 0 360.
51. The last paragraph of FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 214 makes applicable to the
spouse failing to contribute to family expenses the same provisions of the Code de
Procedure Civile designed to enforce payment of alimony obligations. C. PRO. Civ. art.
864; C. PON. art. 357.2; Law no. 73-5 of 2 Jan. 1973, which is found following FRENCH
CIv. CODE art. 211 (71 re ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1973-74); WEILL n 0 323, 328.
52. The Law of 22 Sept. 1942 specifically allowed such representation in three
cases: conventional representation by express mandate, judicially authorized represen-
tation by one finding his spouse in a state unable to express his will, and legal represen-
tation by the wife to bind the community for household expenses. The first two provi-
sions were expressly maintained by the 1965 law and the final was supplanted by a
ptovision empowering the wife directly to bind the community for household expenses.
MAZEAUD n 0 20.
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and responsibilities as any ordinary mandate.5" A spouse may also
seek judicial authorization to act for the other when the latter cannot
manifest his will."4 The spouses may also act for one another under
the general rules of quasi-contract resulting from management of
another's affairs (gestion d'affaire).11
Liability for Family Expenditures
Several basic rules in the new legislation, which apply to all
matrimonial regimes and cannot be derogated from by the marriage
contract, enable the wife to participate more fully in the management
of family finances, though most of these provisions are termed so as
to apply to both spouses equally. 5 The first is that each spouse has
the right to contract alone for the maintenance of the household or
the education of the children. Such contracts bind the spouses soli-
darily and therefore obligate all separate and community property
unless they represent purchases with time payments or expenditures
manifestly excessive with regard to the family's lifestyle, the transac-
tion's usefulness or the bad faith of third persons involved.57 In these
latter cases, the contract is binding on the spouse who has made it,
but not on the non-contracting spouse, and the creditors may there-
fore seize only the contracting spouse's separate property or com-
munity property." The solidary obligation created by such expendi-
tures seems the most important change provided by the new law,
since even before 1965 the wife could contract for household expenses
in her capacity as her husband's legal representative, but only the
community and the husband's separate property were thereby obli-
gated to the creditors.5"
53. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 218; MAZEAUD n * 21.
54. This provision, originally enacted in 1942 for the benefit of prisoners of war
held in Germany, was continued by the 1965 law. It applies only when a spouse cannot
manifest his own will in administering his affairs, and not to situations where a spouse
seeks to supplant the expressed will of the other. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 219. The details
of this procedure are provided in the Code de Procedure Civile involving basically a
request for authorization to the president of the district civil court, which is decided
upon the three-judge tribunal of the court. MAZEAUD n 0 22.
55. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 219; MAZEAUD n o 23.
56. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 226 states that these provisions are applicable to all
marriages by the single fact of the marriage, no matter which matrimonial regime the
spouses have chosen, unless a certain matrimonial regime is specifically excepted by
the article. The provision that each spouse will control his gains and salaries is also a
mandatory provision of the new law. See text at n.38 supra.
57. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 220.
58. MAZEAUD n * 24.
59. As mentioned earlier, traditional French jurisprudence accorded a tacit man-
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Wife's Separate Profession
The new regime grants to each spouse complete control over all
of his personal income, whether derived from his employment or his
property, once he has contributed toward the family expenses.10 This
guarantee, however, is supplemented by several other provisions con-
sidered necessary to effect the independent control of property, one
of the most essential being the married woman's right to exercise a
separate profession without her husband's consent.' Interestingly
enough, this change benefits the husband perhaps as much as the
wife, since before 1965 his consent was assumed, whether expressed
or not, therefore obligating both his separate and community prop-
erty for any debts contracted by the wife in her exercise of a separate
profession. However under the new law the husband's separate prop-
erty is not obligated unless he expressly agrees to the act or to her
practice of a profession generally, or unless he participates in her
profession.62 The wife engaged in a separate profession may also find
her ability to obtain credit strengthened under the new law which
specifically provides that her creditors may seize her biens reserv6s
in payment of her debts, including those unrelated to her profession. 3
Individual Bank Accounts
Under traditional French jurisprudence a wife could not admin-
ister any banking operations under her own name, but in 194261 she
was allowed to operate a special account with funds provided by her
husband for the purpose of meeting household expenses, in keeping
with her legal mandate to contract for those necessities. The bank
was obligated, however, to notify the husband of the opening of such
an account and could allow no overdrafts without his express permis-
sion. 5 The 1965 reform expressly guaranteed the right of either spouse
to open and operate any deposit or checking account in his own name
without the consent of the other."6 Theoretically such an account in
date to the wife to represent her husband in contracting for household necessities; the
Law of 22 Sept. 1942 confirmed this jurisprudence by establishing a legal mandate
applicable to all matrimonial regimes enabling the wife to represent her husband in
such transactions. The jurisprudence, however, tended to hold the wife as a subsidiary
obligor in cases of the husband's insolvency by virtue of her obligation to contribute
to household expenses. WEILL n 0 330.
60. FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 224, 1401, 1425; MAZEAUD n 0 25, 129.
61. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 223.
62. MAZEAUD n 0 257.
63. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 225.
64. Law of 22 Sept. 1942.
65. WEILL n * 332.
66. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 221.
19741
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
a wife's name could be overdrawn as well, but since an overdraft for
non-household expenses would obligate only the wife's separate prop-
erty, it is doubtful that the bank would allow such overdrafts without
the husband's authorization which secures the loan with the entire
community and separate property of both spouses. Despite this
practical limitation, this right finally acquired by the French wife
represents perhaps the greatest progress towaid independent admin-
istration of her property. 7
Safeguards
In contrast to the guarantees of independence provided by the
1965 reform, the new law also establishes several safeguards against
extensive harm to the family security by the irresponsibility of one
of the spouses. This protection is provided by the requirement that
certain acts be performed by both spouses together and by the possi-
bility for judicial removal of a spouse's administrative powers. 8 Two
types of transactions must be performed by the spouses together to
effectively bind them both: the disposal of any rights assuring the
family dwelling"0 and any purchases made on credit to be paid for by
time payments.70 Those acts affecting the security of the family
dwelling include any acts obligating the family to leave the residence
or making their right of occupation more precarious, including leasing
or subleasing the dwelling or part of it to a third person, renouncing
the right to renew the lease of the residence or alienating the usufruct
or right of habitation of the dwelling." If a spouse performs such an
act without the consent of the other, the non-consenting spouse has
one year from the date he learned of it to nullify the act, except that
this right to nullify terminates in all cases one year after dissolution
of the marriage."
Conclusion
Though the reforms brought by the laws of 1965 and 1970 seem
to provide for extensive equalization of the rights and responsibilities
of the spouses during marriage, the changes have been viewed rather
67. MAZEAUD n 0 322.
68. FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 220.1 - 220.3; WEILL n 0 336.
69. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 215.
70. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 220; MAZEAUD n 0 240; WEILL no 331(b).
71. WEILL no 334 n.2. The jurisprudence has held, however, that a spouse may
alienate the naked ownership of the dwelling if he retains the usufruct in favor of the
surviving spouse. 16 Dec. 1970, D.1971, Somm. 61 (Trib. gr. inst. Paris); Gaz. Pal.
1971.2.115.
72. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 215; WEILL n * 334.
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unfavorably by a great many of the legal profession. Critics claim
that because the reforms severely restrict the portion of the family's
assets under the control of either spouse, a creditor must require
either consent of both spouses or a mandate from the non-contracting
spouse allowing the other to effect the transaction. The procedures
for judicial settlement have also been criticized as being totally con-
trary to the Frenchman's view of the private nature of the family unit.
Other members of the French legal profession have seen the single
important feature of the reform as the establishment of a regime quite
similar to a separation of property and resent the abandonment of the
traditional civilian community regime. Despite these criticisms the
new- laws represent important advancements toward equal rights and
responsibilities for the spouses and illustrate possible alternatives
should Louisiana be faced with revision of its domestic law in light
of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Carolyn Hazel
